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Abstract
Moral error theorists often respond to the epistemic companions in guilt strategy by
adopting the Disparity Response: reject the putative parity between moral and epistemic
reasons and claim that though the former are irreducibly normative, the latter aren’t. I
argue such a response fails. Expanding on Das’ Australas J Philos 95(1):58–69, (2017)
work I present a master argument against Disparity Responses: the arguments moral error
theorists use to advance their conceptual claim apply in the epistemic domain also. This
prohibits the error theorist from adopting epistemic reductionism. I use Jonas Olson’s
work as exemplary of moral error theory. I demonstrate that Olson’s (2014) argument that
the rhetorical authority of moral claims is best explained by the error theorist’s conceptual
claim applies equally in the epistemic case. Olson (2018) attempts to avoid this by
claiming that epistemic claims are reducible to claims about whether our doxastic
attitudes live up to their functions. There are two problems with Olson’s (2018) argument.
Firstly, functional reasons are a species of a common genus – standards reasons – and
since Olson’s authority argument against moral reductionism applies to standards reasons,
it applies to functional reasons. Secondly, Olson’s (2018) claim that we cannot also cast
moral reasons as functional is under-supported. I suggest that there is plausible evidence
that we can and undermine his arguments against this claim. I do not argue that the
epistemic companions in guilt strategy demonstrates the falsity of moral error theory.
Rather, I argue that the Disparity Response to the epistemic companions in guilt strategy
fails.
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1 Introduction
Moral error theory is the view that our everyday moral discourse commits us to the existence
of irreducibly normative reasons but that since there are no such things, our discourse is
systematically mistaken.1 J. L. Mackie claimed that the most effective response to moral error
theory would be to introduce “companions in guilt.”2 One prominent companion discussed in
recent years has been epistemic reasons, leading to the epistemic companions in guilt strategy.3
This strategy attempts to lend credibility to moral reasons by demonstrating their similarity to
epistemic reasons whose existence we should not reject. One way to dismiss this strategy is to
reject the parity and claim that though moral reasons are irreducibly normative, epistemic
reasons are not. Call this the Disparity Response to the epistemic companions in guilt strategy.
Moral error theorists argue for the conceptual part of their view by claiming that the best
explanation for the apparent authority of our moral discourse is that our common-sense
conception of moral discourse implies that moral judgements are irreducibly normative.4
These arguments apply equally, however, to our epistemic discourse. If they show that we
take our moral claims to be irreducibly normative, then they do so for our epistemic claims too.
The error theorist’s own arguments deny her the Disparity Response. This is the master
argument against the Disparity Response.5
There are two ways to respond to this argument. The first is to find a profile for epistemic
reasons which makes them immune from the arguments moral error theorists use to support the
conceptual claim. The second is to find more fine-grained arguments for the conceptual claim
that only apply to moral reasons.
I demonstrate the potency of the master argument by using Jonas Olson’s work as
exemplary of moral error theory.6 The difficulties facing Olson illustrate a general tension in
the combination of moral error theory and epistemic reductionism. Olson (2018) adopts the
first response to the master argument. I argue that this fails.
In §2–3 I make some preliminary remarks, introduce some terms and distinctions and
explain the dialectical background to, and motivation for, this discussion. In §4 I discuss
Olson’s move towards the Disparity Response. In §5–8 I discuss the parity between moral and
epistemic reasons and reject Olson’s (2018) disparity response. I present the master argument
against the Disparity Response in §9.
2 Preliminaries
Firstly, a note on reasons. I follow contemporary orthodoxy in supposing that if there are any
primitive normative concepts, then the concept of a reason is the only one.7 I additionally
1 This is the particular kind of moral error theory that concerns me here.
2 (1990/1977, p.39). Interestingly, Mackie discusses error theory first in his (1946).
3 Especially after Cuneo (2007).
4 That this is the common-sense conception does not require that people understand or use terms such as
‘irreducibly normative.’
5 Inspired by Das (2017).
6 (2011, 2014, 2018).
7 This orthodoxy is established by authors like Scanlon (1998) and Parfit (2011). See Broome (2013) and Manne
(2014) for alternatives. My argument need not depend on reasons primitivism of the sort stated, I adopt it for
dialectical ease of presentation.
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accept the common assumption that normative reasons are facts,8 and that they stand in
favouring relations to courses of behaviour.9
Secondly, a notion that plays a key role in this literature is metaphysical queerness. The idea
that moral reasons are queer is presented, by error theorists, as reason to think they do not exist.
What it is for an entity to be queer in the relevant way is not our concern. It is what makes
moral reasons queer that interests us. There is debate on this, but the kind of error theory
considered here claims it is their irreducible normativity.10 A reason is irreducibly normative
iff the favouring relation, in which it stands to the relevant behaviour, is irreducibly normative
– i.e. cannot be described (or analysed) in purely descriptive terms. There is no conceptual
space to ask whether an irreducibly normative reason should be a consideration for us; it
simply is. A reason is categorical iff it is irreducibly normative.
3 The Problem
The problem we are concerned with begins with linguistic phenomena in need of explanation.
We say things about what we, individually or collectively, should do - what we have reason to
do.11 This includes claims about both how we should act and what we should believe (and
why). Following Cuneo (2016) let us call sentences which incorporate paradigmatically moral
terms such as ‘wrong’, ‘obligatory’, ‘fair’ etc. in the predicate position moral sentences. Call
commonplace, and sincere, uses of such sentences our everyday moral discourse. Similarly,
sentences that incorporate paradigmatically epistemic terms such as ‘rational’, ‘warranted’ or
‘justified’ in the predicate position are epistemic sentences and commonplace, and sincere,
uses of such sentences constitutes our everyday epistemic discourse.12 Our everyday moral
and epistemic discourse needs explanation in two senses. Firstly, we need an explanation of
what we think we are doing when we utter moral/epistemic sentences. Secondly, we need an
explanation of whether we are successful.
The first explanandum requires an exploration of our common-sense conception of these
discourses. Cuneo (2007) suggests that our common-sense conception is constituted by
platitudes of two sorts – content and authority.
The content platitudes state that any non-deviant moral or epistemic system must involve
substantive propositions like the following: <It is wrong to kill recreationally> or < It is wrong
to disregard evidence out of laziness>. The content platitudes roughly delineate the norms that
feature in our common-sense conception of proper moral/epistemic practice.
The authority platitudes concern the normative force of moral and epistemic facts – if there
are any. They tell us that moral and epistemic facts have two features. Firstly, they are
prescriptive – they indicate reasons for us to behave in certain ways. Secondly, they are
authoritative – the reasons that they indicate are irreducibly normative.
With respect to the second explanandum, I concern myself with two positions. The first is
error theory which has two stages:
8 For a discussion of this see Glüer-Pagin and Wikforss (2017).
9 Like Olson (2014) I understand ‘behaviour’ broadly – including doxastic behaviour like forming beliefs. For
exemplar formulations of the favouring relation – Bedke (2010, p.48) or Cuneo (2007, p.65).
10 For an example of such debate compare Brink (1984) and Garner (1990).
11 In addition, there are mental phenomena – we think things about what we should do. Arguments for the
conceptual claim tend to focus on the linguistic phenomena and therefore so do I.
12 These are intended as working definitions.
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1. Conceptual: Our everyday moral discourse involves commitment to the irreducible
normativity of moral reasons.
2. Ontological: There are no irreducibly normative reasons.
The conceptual claim affirms commitment to the authority platitudes. When this is combined
with the ontological claim (2) the result is that our moral discourse (and thought) is system-
atically erroneous. Moral discourse attempts to represent irreducible moral reasons but since
there are no such things, it is erroneous. Epistemic error theory is an epistemic analogue of
moral error theory, holding that our epistemic discourse commits the same systematic onto-
logical error. This is the form of error theory Olson proposes and, since I use his work as
exemplary, it is the form I engage with.13
The second is reductionism.14 Moral reductionism is the view that moral reasons exist and
are reducibly normative. As Cuneo (2007) points out, reductionist accounts reject the authority
platitudes.15 Epistemic reductionism is an epistemic analogue of moral reductionism.
Error theory and reductionism differ in that the former views our talk, and thought, of
reasons as regarding irreducibly normative reasons whereas the latter does not.16 The view that
concerns me here is the combination of moral error theory and epistemic reductionism. This
combination is of dialectical interest because it is used as a response to the epistemic
companions in guilt strategy.
The epistemic companions in guilt strategy attempts to defend the credentials of moral
reasons by establishing a parity with epistemic reasons. The problematic feature of both is that
they are irreducibly normative. The argument runs as follows:
1. Parity Premise: If the arguments for moral error theory establish its truth, then they (or
relevant analogues) establish epistemic error theory.
2. Epistemic Existence Premise: Epistemic error theory is false.
3. Conclusion: Arguments for moral error theory do not establish the truth of moral error
theory.17
One rejoinder to this argument is the Disparity Response: reject the Parity Premise and claim
that though moral reasons are irreducible, epistemic reasons aren’t.
I argue that this response is unsatisfactory. Prima facie evidence for the Parity Premise
shows that those who wish to reject it are required to provide arguments for doing so. Moral
error theorists cannot provide such arguments without contradicting their support for the
conceptual claim.
I do not claim to show that the error theorist cannot escape or defuse the epistemic
companions in guilt strategy, but only that this attempt at doing so fails. The error theorist
13 Cowie (2019, ch. 1) explains how it differs to an error theory based on the non-existence of categorical
reasons.
14 I have in mind unobvious analytic reductionism, knowable a priori, though my argument doesn’t rely on this.
15 One might object that metaphysical reductionism about moral/epistemic reasons is consistent with the view
that our common-sense conception includes the authority platitudes. This, however, would be an error theory
(though not the one that concerns us). It would be the view that when discussing moral/epistemic issues we are
not only ontologically mistaken but also semantically mistaken in that it refers to something other than what was
intended. I therefore do not consider this position a form of reductionism.
16 As Das puts it, the difference “concerns the conceptual profile of…reasons” (2017, p.58).
17 Cowie’s (2014) formulation.
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may choose to reject the Epistemic Existence premise.18 This is a radical and intuitively
unattractive position however.19 We should take the epistemic companions in guilt argument
seriously. Figure 1. maps out the relevant conceptual space:
4 Reducible Reasons and Olson’s Move to the Disparity Response
Olson defends an error theory regarding irreducibly normative favouring relations; his work
provides an informative case study because of his recent shift towards the Disparity Response.
Previously Olson (2014) conceded the Parity Premise and defended both moral and
epistemic error theory. He argued that the consequences of accepting epistemic error theory
are not as undesirable as they seem. In this response Olson presents a distinction relevant to our
current concerns.
Olson (2014) claimed that ‘reason’ is equivocal between an irreducible and reducible sense.
He countenances two types of reducible reasons: hypothetical and conventional reasons.20 To
say that some agent, A, has hypothetical reason to p is to say that A has some goal/desire
which would be (likely) fulfilled were she to p. Hypothetical reasons are understood as
reducible to empirical claims about the agent’s desires and means of bringing about their
satisfaction.21
Conventional reasons are reducible to claims about what is in accordance with, or in
violation of, conventions. For example, according to the rules of soccer, outfield players are
prohibited from using their hands to control the ball. This gives Lionel Messi a conventional
reason not to use his hand whilst playing. This reduces to the claim that doing so would be in
violation of the rules of soccer.
A reductionist is hypotheticalist or conventionalist depending on whether they claim that
the relevant reasons are hypothetical or conventional. Note that, reducible reasons only apply
to those who meet certain conditions – having the relevant desires or engaging in the relevant
activity.
Olson’s (2018) response to the epistemic companions in guilt strategy is different. Though
Olson still believes that the consequences for holding epistemic error theory are not as
undesirable as Cuneo suggests, he leaves this to one side. He favours epistemic reductionism,
over epistemic error theory, but remains a moral error theorist. As such he adopts the Disparity
Response. I shall show that Olson’s (2018) response fails and extract a master argument
against the Disparity Response from it.
5 Prima Facie Support for the Parity Premise
To set the scene for the master argument I shall establish that there is prima facie evidence in
favour of the Parity Premise. The burden of proof, therefore, lies with those who wish to reject
it.
18 E.g. Streumer (2017) endorses meta-normative error theory.
19 See Cuneo (2007, p.117–120).
20 Olson calls conventional reasons “reasons reducible to correctness norms” (2014, p.159), my use of ‘conven-
tional reasons’ is to avoid confusion in later sections.
21 This interpretation is contested. My interpretation is more stringent than Joyce’s (2001, p.122). Furthermore,
Bedke (2010) claims that hypothetical reasons are irreducibly normative.
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There are many different considerations in favour of the Parity Premise. I present here the
two that I find most convincing.22 The first is that both epistemic and moral reasons seem to be
categorical – they seem to apply to us independently of our desires and commitments in a way
that marks them as irreducibly normative. Consider two paradigmatic cases of an agent having
a reason. First, an epistemic example:
Train: I look at the departure board. It says that my train leaves at 0825. Surely this
evidential consideration is a normative reason for me to believe that the train leaves at
0825...whether or not I want to believe that my train leaves at 0825. So, the normative
reason is…categorical.23
Contrast this to the following example of an agent having a moral reason:
Help: I see a child struggling to swim in a pond. Nobody else is around and she will die
if nobody intervenes. This fact is a normative reason for me to save her and surely this is
so, whether or not I want to save her. So, the normative reason is categorical.
In both these cases it seems that the relevant reason is categorical – it applies independently of
my desires or commitments. Consider the following two conversations as further evidence.
First the epistemic case:
Fanatic:
A: ‘You should believe the theory of evolution.’
B: ‘Why?’
A: ‘There is more evidence for it than for competing theories.’
B: ‘I don’t care about evidence.’
A: ‘That doesn’t matter, you still should believe the theory of evolution!’
Second, the moral case:
22 For others – Kearns and Star (2009, p.220–22).
23 Cowie (2016, p.117).
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Liar:
A: ‘You should not have lied!’
B: ‘Why not?’
A: ‘Lying is morally wrong.’
B: ‘I don’t care about morality.’
A: ‘That doesn’t matter, you still shouldn’t have lied!’
In both cases A’s final response suggests that the relevant reason is categorical. It doesn’t
matter what desires or commitments B has, the reasons still intuitively apply. In both sets of
examples, epistemic and moral reasons seem to mirror each other. That both moral and
epistemic reasons seem to be categorical suggests that they are both irreducibly normative.24
The second consideration in support of the Parity Premise is the structural isomorphism
between moral and epistemic reasons. Cuneo (2007) observes that moral and epistemic reasons
share what he labels appraisable entities and modes of response.
Starting with the former, our normative appraisal gives rise to reasons to adopt certain
courses of behaviour. Let us call any entity that is open to moral assessment a morally
appraisable entity – analogously in the epistemic case. There is vast overlap between morally
and epistemically appraisable entities. It is not simply that moral appraisals apply to actions
and intentions whereas epistemic appraisals apply to beliefs. Rather they both apply to a wide
range of entities – institutions, persons, intentions, actions, propositional attitudes, emotions,
character traits, etc.
Let us use the term ‘mode of response’ to refer to the sorts of responses that reasons favour.
For instance, a reason may favour the formation of a propositional attitude or the execution of
an action. Cuneo points out that there will be significant overlap between the class of all and
only the modes of response moral reasons favour, and the analogous epistemic class. It is not
the case that moral reasons favour only the formation of intentions and the execution of actions
whereas epistemic reasons favour only the formation of propositional attitudes. Rather episte-
mic and moral reasons, respectively, favour all sorts of responses.
We can reformulate Cuneo’s observation as follows – consider the following schema
(where X is an appraisable entity and Y a mode of response):
The moral/epistemic appraisal of X gives rise to a moral/epistemic reason to Y.
Moral appraisal gives rise to moral reasons, epistemic appraisal gives rise to epistemic reasons.
Cuneo is pointing out that we shouldn’t think a certain kind of entity should replace X and Y
when considering moral reasons but a different kind should when considering epistemic
reasons.
Consider the following examples. The first pairs a moral reason with an appraisable entity
and mode of response which appear better suited to an epistemic reason:
Example 1: Gemma’s belief that her son is missing gives her a moral reason to hope that
he is still alive.
24 It may be objected that one can derive different conversational evidence in the epistemic case. For example, it
may be implausible that A would respond to B in such a way if they were discussing B’s putative reason to
believe a trivial truth. I put this aside noting that such a case should be considered an exception and does not
undermine the prima facie evidence presented here. For discussion of this issue consult Cowie (2019) as well as
Adam Leite and Thomas Kelly’s discussion of epistemic instrumentalism – Kelly (2003, 2007) and Leite (2007).
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The second pairs an epistemic reason with an appraisable entity and mode of response which
appear better suited to a moral reason.
Example 2: Gemma’s intention to help Gary through his trauma gives her an epistemic
reason to call his friend and discuss how to do so.
Some moral reasons can be theoretical and some epistemic reasons practical. It seems strange
to suggest that one type is irreducible whereas the other is not.
It may be objected that these considerations apply equally to paradigmatically hypothetical
reasons – namely prudential reasons.25 Regarding the fact that we speak about moral and
epistemic reasons as if they are categorical (the first consideration) it might be pointed out that
parallel data can be generated for prudential reasons. Consider:
Smoker:
A: ‘You shouldn’t smoke.’
B: ‘Why not? Smoking is great!’
A: ‘It makes your teeth yellow.’
B: ‘I don’t care.’
A: ‘That doesn’t matter, you still shouldn’t smoke!’
The objector may claim that this is a cogent exchange, yet it doesn’t speak in favour of the
claim: if moral reasons are categorical, then so are prudential reasons.26
Regarding the fact that moral and epistemic reasons share appraisable entities and modes of
response (the second consideration) one may point out that moral reasons share both
appraisable entities and modes of response with prudential reasons. Actions (and propositional
attitudes) can be both morally and prudentially (in)advisable. Both moral and prudential
reasons may license a range of responses.
To this objection I give two responses. Firstly, these considerations are presented only as
prima facie evidence for the Parity Premise. Secondly, it is not clear that prudential reasons are
paradigmatically hypothetical.27 As far as these considerations go, there is a prima facie case
for the irreducibility of prudential reasons. This data suggests that we should carefully consider
our view on prudential reasons.
6 Olson’s Attack on Finlay – a Double Edged Sword
Having provided prima facie support for the Parity Premise, I now look to Ramon Das’ (2017)
work demonstrating that Olson’s authority argument against moral reductionism applies
equally in the epistemic domain.28 The authority argument is representative of Olson’s
arguments for the conceptual claim. This provides me with the resources to both combat
Olson’s (2018) argument against the Parity Premise (§8) and formulate a master argument
against the Disparity Response (§9).
Since Olson is a moral error theorist, he is committed to the authority platitudes. This leads
Olson (2011, 2014) to criticise Stephen Finlay’s (2008, 2009, 2014) end-relational account of
25 Thank you to an anonymous reader for this suggestion.
26 Note, one could claim that A’s final response is unintuitive. I put this response aside since it feels less
appropriate if, for example, A was noting the serious physical harm smoking does.
27 See Fletcher (2018, forthcoming).
28 ‘Authority argument’ is my label rather than Olson’s.
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moral terms and reductionism regarding moral reasons. Das has argued that Olson’s objections
against Finlay apply equally well in the epistemic case and that therefore Olson, by his own
lights, should also view epistemic reasons as irreducibly normative. It is not the success or
failure of Olson’s objections to Finlay’s account that is of primary importance here. Rather it is
their equal applicability in the moral and epistemic domains. As I shall demonstrate in §9, this
makes it difficult for moral error theorists to reject the Parity Premise.29
Finlay is a reductionist about normative reasons (and a fortiori about moral reasons). He
presents an end-relational semantics of our moral terms, claiming that our use of language is
not evidence that we understand moral reasons as irreducibly normative. For Finlay, all reasons
are relative to some end. The relevant ends are not merely desires, Finlay’s account accom-
modates reducible reasons of all sorts.30 Normative reasons are understood as probabilistic
explanations why something is good – relative to some end:
‘a reason for s to ϕ’ is used as elliptical for ‘a reason [why it’s good] for s to ϕ’, and
means an explanation why it’s good if s ϕs.31
Olson objects that Finlay’s account is not the best explanation of the apparent authority of our
moral discourse.32 Call this the authority argument. He starts by noting that cases of moral
disagreement are evidence for the conceptual claim of moral error theory. In such cases we
pursue moral arguments, sometimes with people who have different fundamental moral values
to us. This suggests that we take moral reasons to apply even to those who have differing goals
and commitments. Finlay’s account must provide an alternative explanation for this
phenomenon.
Finlay tries to undermine this evidence by claiming that in cases where there is disagree-
ment, our attempts to convince each other should be understood pragmatically.33 Our moral
claims have pragmatic authority. They can be considered successful if they motivate others to
comply with our ends. We withhold the relative ends of our moral judgements to achieve this.
By withholding the relative ends from moral utterances, speakers speak as if something were
true of the audience (namely that they share the withheld end).34 The effect is that the speaker
expresses a prescription demanding that the audience share the withheld end. For example, by
omitting ‘according to end e’ from the claim ‘…you shouldn’t steal that purse’ I give rhetorical
authority to the claim. This is an attempt to motivate you to comply with my ends – it is a
rhetorical tool. The idea is that “pragmatically categorical use of normative language…[is] a
particularly effective way of exerting strong prescriptive force on an agent.”35
Contra this pragmatics-first approach, Olson believes that the rhetorical force of our moral
claims is best explained by their semantics. Olson writes that “moral claims have rhetorical
force because they are or entail claims about irreducibly normative reasons.”36 He asks us to
consider two claims:
29 Rowland (2013, p.4–5) noted a similar tension between hypotheticalist epistemic reductionism and moral error
theory. I show that it applies to all forms of reductionism.
30 Consequently, arguments against it apply to reducible reasons of all forms.
31 (2014, p.94).
32 Das (2017) also considers an argument Joyce (2001) presents against Finlay which is similar to the authority
argument.
33 Finlay (2014, Ch. 8).
34 To speak as if agents share an end is to make utterances that would be co-operative, in the Gricean sense, were
it the case that the end is shared.
35 (Finlay 2014, p.187).
36 (2014, p.129).
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Spoon: ‘It is bad manners to eat peas with a spoon.’Tax: ‘It is mor lly wrong to cheat on your tax declaration.’
Both Spoon and Tax are, according to Finlay, relativized to a withheld end. Yet Tax has greater
rhetorical force than Spoon. Finlay’s explanation for this discrepancy is that moral ends are of
greater concern to us and so we are more serious about our moral appraisals than our appraisals
regarding etiquette. Olson objects that “one would expect the difference in seriousness and
intransigence between moral…and etiquette claims to be reflected in the concepts we use to
make them. The conceptual claim makes good on this expectation.”37
Furthermore, Olson adds that it is hard to see how moral claims could maintain their greater
rhetorical force if they shared conceptual status with etiquette claims. If Finlay is correct, then
someone who doesn’t care about the relevant end could waive Tax just as easily as they could
waive Spoon. Yet this is intuitively not the case, and the conceptual claim gives a good
explanation as to why –moral claims are irreducibly normative, etiquette claims are not. Olson
applies this criticism to both hypotheticalist and conventionalist moral reductionism.38
Overall, Olson claims that it is implausible that the authority of our moral claims is purely a
pragmatic matter. The crucial point is that Olson’s argument applies equally well in the
epistemic domain.39 Consider a third claim:
Alien: ‘It is irrational to believe that Tony Blair is an alien.’
Olson’s complaint against Finlay was that an end-relational semantics, with a focus on
pragmatics, fails to capture the authority of our moral judgements. Yet the same goes for our
epistemic judgements. If Alien was relativized to a (withheld) end, and we thought of it as
such, then we would expect the rhetorical force of Alien to match that of Spoon. Yet Alien has
greater rhetorical force than Spoon. Furthermore, Alien would fail to retain its greater rhetorical
force if it were implicitly relative. This is so for the aforementioned reason – from the
perspective of someone who doesn’t care for the relevant ends Alien would be as easy to
waive as Spoon.
Independently of how powerful Olson’s objection is, the crucial point is this: if Olson’s
argument shows that our moral discourse is best explained by an account which incorporates
the conceptual claim, then it does so regarding our epistemic discourse as well. Olson (2018)
attempts to avoid this conclusion.
7 Olson’s (Not So) New Form of Reducible Reason
Olson (2018) holds that epistemic reasons are reducible. Interestingly, however, he claims that
they are neither conventional, nor hypothetical. Olson uses this as the basis for an argument
against the Parity Premise. If these new reducible reasons are relevantly different, then Olson
can claim that they are not threatened by the authority argument. Olson is adopting the first of
the two retorts on behalf of Disparity Responses. Combined with Olson’s argument that there
are no corresponding moral reasons of the same type, this yields a successful Disparity
Response.
Olson focuses on something that, at first, seems peculiar to the epistemic domain – the truth
norm of belief. One intuitive feature of belief is that it ‘aims at truth’. As Williams (2004)
37 (Ibid).
38 Olson (2014, p.129–3).
39 As Das (2017) pointed out.
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explains, the idea is that it is a fatal objection to a belief that it is false. If someone accepts that
a belief is false they thereby cease to have the belief (consciously). Recognising the falsity of
one’s belief is enough to abandon it. This is usually seen as evidence that epistemic reasons are
irreducibly normative because it implies that the very practice of believing is regulated by a
norm. Olson takes what looks to be an enemy of epistemic reductionism and turns it into an ally.
Olson claims that “the cognitive capacity of belief formation has a characteristic aim or
function” in a similar way to the heart.40 This function is to “help subjects navigate and explain
the world that they find themselves in, by carrying correct…information about subjects’
surroundings.”41 For a belief to fulfil its function properly it must be formed in accordance
with the appropriate epistemic norms. We can thus say that a belief is well-formed, given the
function of belief, if it is, for example, based on evidence. Olson gives the following definition:
for a consideration, E, to be an epistemic reason for an agent to believe that p is for it to
be the case that were the agent to believe that p on the basis of E, the agent’s belief that p
would be, to that extent, well-formed, or as it ought functionally to be.42
Epistemic reasons are reducible because it is an open question whether it “ought to be that the entity
fulfils that function or whether there are reasons for agents to ensure that…[it does].”43 Similarly, it is
an open question whether Messi should engage in the activity of soccer, where doing so makes
various conventional reasons apply to him. It is not an open question whether irreducible reasons
apply. On this account, error theorists about irreducibly normative reasons can claim that there is a
truth norm governing belief since this is “simply to say that a cognitive system in which individual
beliefs are based on evidence [for example] is, to that extent, well-functioning.”44
For this understanding of epistemic reasons to be useful to Olson in building a disparity
response it must not have a moral analogue. Moral error theorists do discuss the function of
morality however (my italics):
…part of the reason why moral thought and talk evolved is their coordinating and
regulative functions that are highly useful from an evolutionary perspective.45
The function of morality is primarily to counteract this limitation of men’s sympathies.46
Morality, I will argue, functions to bolster self-control.47
Alert to this, Olson considers the potential for an analogous argument for the reducibility of
moral reasons. The idea would be that moral judgements (qua moral judgements) have a
characteristic function(s) which support the view that moral reasons are reducibly normative.
Olson claims that this analogy fails and that a disparity holds between epistemic and moral
reasons. He argues that though the function of belief supports a particular view of reasons for
belief, “it is not clear how a view of the characteristic function of moral judgements could
support any kind of view of moral reasons – a category that includes reasons for actions and
reason for attitudes other than [and including] belief – and not just a view of reasons for moral
judgements.”48
40 Olson (2018, p.12).
41 (ibid, p.13).
42 (Ibid, p.14).
43 (Ibid, p.14).
44 (Ibid, p.14).
45 Olson (2014, p.128).
46 Mackie (1977/1990, p.108).
47 Joyce (2001, p.181).
48 (2018, p.19).
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Furthermore, Olson adds that it is partly the irreducible normativity of our moral concepts
which enables moral judgements to fulfil their functions of “promoting cooperation, solving
coordination problems, and blocking weakness of will.”49
8 Responding to Olson’s New Suggestion
Olson’s disparity response has two parts:
1. Create a profile for epistemic reasons that makes them immune to his arguments against
moral reductionism.
2. Show that moral reasons do not share this profile.
Correspondingly, I present two responses to Olson’s new suggestion. I start by demonstrating
that Olson’s new account of epistemic reasons makes them a species of a genus – standards
reasons. I then, as my first response, show that Olson’s authority argument against moral
reductionism applies to standards reasons and so to epistemic reasons as he has cast them. This
objection targets the first half of Olson’s disparity response and is an extension of Das’ (2017)
argument discussed above. My second response is to argue that an analogous account of moral
reasons is conceivable and to question why it is less plausible than its epistemic analogue. This
undermines the second half of Olson’s disparity response. Overall, Olson’s new account of
epistemic reasons fails to demonstrate a disparity between epistemic and moral reasons.
Let us call reasons reducible to claims about the performance of an entity as compared to its
function, functional reasons. Functional reasons are not, in any important sense, new or
different. Conventional reasons and functional reasons are two species of a common genus:
reasons reducible to claims about standards or, standards reasons.50
Consider how the reducibility of both conventional and functional reasons is demonstrated.
In both cases we reduce these reason claims to descriptive claims matching performance to a
standard, namely a standard which isn’t compulsory. Consider the following:
1. Conventional: You shouldn’t use your hands during a soccer game. This reduces to the
claim: using your hands violates the rules (conventions) of soccer. Since this is a
descriptive claim, the reason is reducible.
2. Functional: You should believe in accordance with evidence. On Olson’s analysis this
reduces to the claim: were you to believe in accordance with evidence, your beliefs would
be well-formed according to their function. Since this is a descriptive claim, the reason is
reducible.
For a belief to be well-formed according to its function is simply for it to match up to a certain
set of standards. Central to the reducibility of both conventional and functional reasons is the
notion of standards. Whether the standard is set by convention or by function is irrelevant. To
demonstrate that the notion of a standards reason is not an empty catch-all for any type of
reducible reason consider again hypothetical reasons.
49 (Ibid).
50 My terminology departs from Olson’s.
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3. Hypothetical: You should take the M11. This is understood as: If you desire to go to
Cambridge, then you should take the M11. This reduces to: taking the M11 would further
the satisfaction of your desire to get to Cambridge.
This cannot be understood as: the standards of your desires are such that taking the
M11 would satisfy your desires. It is both unnatural and incorrect to say that the standards
of your desires make it such that a certain action constitutes an effective means towards
satisfying them. Rather it is the desires themselves.51
Having shown that functional reasons are standards reasons I now demonstrate that Olson’s
authority argument applies to standards reasons. Olson’s argument against moral reductionism
applies to conventional reasons because conventional reasons are a species of standards reason.
It is the genus, rather than the species, which Olson’s (2014) argument targets.
If moral or epistemic claims, such as Tax or Alien, were, in fact, claims about how certain
courses of behaviour match up to certain standards, then they would lack the rhetorical strength
that they intuitively have. This would be the case for the reason discussed above – if these
claims reduce to claims about standards, ones which we are not obliged to adopt, then we can
legitimately waive them if we do not care for these standards. If you didn’t care for the relevant
standards, then Tax or Alienwould be just as easy to waive as Spoon. Intuitively, however, they
are not. The intuitively stronger rhetorical force of Tax or Alien is better explained by the
conceptual claim. The authority argument applies to standards reasons. As such it applies to
Olson’s new form of epistemic reductionism. This constitutes my first response to Olson.52
The second response is to point out that it seems plausible that one can tell a story for moral
reasons that is analogous to the one Olson tells regarding epistemic reasons. Olson argued
against this by claiming that no function of moral judgements (qua moral judgements) could
support any kind of view of moral reasons since moral reasons are so wide ranging.53 Firstly,
as seen in §5, there is evidence that epistemic reasons also include reasons for actions and
reasons for attitudes other than, and including, belief.54 This is not the key disanalogy Olson
needs. Secondly, Olson claims that it is the irreducibly normative nature of our moral
judgements that make it possible for them to fulfil their function of social co-ordination. It is
unclear why this is true for the moral case but not the epistemic. The authority argument
applies in the epistemic case also.
Here Olson relies on his functional story. The notion of function Olson uses in the epistemic
case is not meant to be a fundamentally normative one – otherwise epistemic reasons would be
irreducibly normative. Rather the idea is that beliefs have a biological function which can be
explained with a descriptive evolutionary story: having correct beliefs about the world helps us
to navigate it and therefore to survive and reproduce.
There is reason to doubt whether the function of belief is, in fact, to accurately represent
reality.55 Putting this aside, however, it seems that an evolutionary story regarding function can
be crafted for moral claims too. The function of moral judgements is to help social co-
ordination and co-operation. For example, consider the maxim: one should not break promises.
51 One might be unconvinced by this and think that hypothetical reasons are a species of standards reasons too.
This would not threaten the overall argument since I go on to demonstrate that the authority argument applies to
standards reasons.
52 This is an extension of Das’ (2017) argument.
53 (2018, p.19).
54 Mirroring Olson’s phrasing (2018, p.19).
55 Hoffman et al. (2015).
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The agreement not to break promises and the condemnation of those who do is plausibly
advantageous in an evolutionary sense. An evolutionary story about how this general maxim
supports social co-operation is conceivable.
The maxim need not be irreducibly normative either. It is an open question whether it ought
to be that moral judgements promote social co-operation or that agents have reason to ensure
that they do. It is evolutionarily advantageous that they do. Yet we are not required to make it
so. Olson (2018) points us back to his arguments against Finlay when claiming that it is the
irreducible normativity of moral concepts that enable moral judgements to fulfil their function.
As we have seen, however, these arguments apply equally to the epistemic case, even with
epistemic reasons understood functionally. As such these arguments are no use in arguing for
disparity.
Perhaps the point is best put as a challenge. If Olson’s (2014) authority argument applies in
the epistemic case, then it does not show that the function of belief grounds a certain account
of epistemic reasons but that the function of moral judgement doesn’t ground an analogous
account of moral reasons. If moral and epistemic reasons are structurally isomorphic, then
neither does Olson’s claim that moral judgments fail to support any particular view of moral
reasons because of their breadth. I wish to remain neutral on what the correct evolutionary
story is for the development of moral and epistemic norms and so I present a challenge to
Olson: explain why such a story of moral reasons is implausible in a way that demonstrates the
disparity between moral and epistemic reasons.
We have two arguments against Olson’s (2018) disparity response. The first is that
functional reasons are not different enough to be immune from the argument Olson himself
proposes against the moral reductionist. Olson’s authority argument applies to his new account
of epistemic reasons. The second is that the claim that an analogous account of moral reasons
cannot be created is, at least, under supported.
It may be objected that the function of moral judgements proposed above is significantly
less determinate than the function of beliefs. That the function of belief is to track truth makes
it clear what our epistemic reasons are. Yet the same is not true in the moral case since the
function of promoting co-operation is too amorphous. In response I note that even though
*promoting social co-operation* may be an amorphous function it is enough to show that we
have at least some moral reasons – like not randomly killing – and the existence of some moral
reasons is enough to refute moral error theory.56 I now give a diagnosis of Olson’s failure and
extract a master argument against the Disparity Response.
9 Diagnosis and the Master Argument
Olson’s arguments for the conceptual claim are not merely arguments against moral reduc-
tionism, they are arguments against normative reductionism. A reason is reducible iff it can be
reduced to a descriptive claim linking a course of behaviour to either a standard or a desire.
Furthermore, reducible reasons are applicable to agents iff they choose to adopt the relevant
standard or desire (which they are not obliged to). This explains why reducible reasons are
neither categorical, nor queer.
It also explains why the authority argument, as well as others, applies to reductionist
accounts. These arguments point out that a reductionist understanding of our moral discourse
56 Thanks to Bart Streumer for this.
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fails to secure the apparent authority of moral claims. The difficulty is that they apply equally
in the epistemic domain. Note that the authority argument for the conceptual claim is not
idiosyncratic. Moral error theorists argue for the conceptual claim by presenting an inference to
the best explanation. They attempt to show that the best explanation of the relevant mental and
linguistic phenomena (i.e. our moral discourse and thought) is that we take moral reasons to
apply to us independently of our desires and commitments. This is easily the most prominent
strategy for supporting the conceptual claim.57
Olson’s account of epistemic reasons as functional is an attempt to explain the universal
authority of our epistemic claims whilst maintaining that epistemic reasons are reducible. He
does this by relying on the constitutive truth norm of belief: beliefs essentially have the
function of carrying correct information (being true) to aid the agent in navigating the world.
Since we are all believers, we all have beliefs which are regulated by the functional standards
of belief formation. This results in universally applicable, but reducible, epistemic reasons.
Since no such functional reasons are available in the moral domain we have the makings of an
argument against the Parity Premise.
My analysis of Olson’s (2018) account of epistemic reasons gives us reason to think that an
analogous functional analysis of moral reasons is equally conceivable. Combined with my re-
application of the authority argument, this refutes Olson’s argument against the Parity Premise.
Olson was concerned that Finlay’s account failed to secure the intuitive authority of the claims
involved. Yet the same is true of Olson’s (2018) account of epistemic reasons.
Olson (2018) has failed to balance universal applicability with reducibility. To see this,
consider this response to his new suggestion: “I agree that beliefs are essentially regulated by
the truth norm. But what if I do not wish to believe? Rather I shall shmelieve. Shmelieving, as a
practice, doesn’t involve regulation by the truth norm.”
This response accepts that the standards of belief formation are such that beliefs are well
formed iff they are regulated by the truth norm but disengages from the practice of believing. It
would be analogous to one accepting that as an outfield soccer player one cannot use one’s
hands, whilst abandoning the activity of soccer altogether. The waivability of reducible reasons
concerned Olson (2014) and it has come back to bite him.
Crucially, this paves the way for the master argument. The very arguments moral error
theorists use to motivate the conceptual claim prohibit an appeal to the Disparity Response.
One might be tempted to claim that though our epistemic claims are not as authoritative as we
thought, this is not concerning. Rather this veneer of authority, this fugitive thought, should be
debunked.58 This option, however, is unavailable to the moral error theorist. She argues for the
conceptual claim by claiming that the best explanation of our moral discourse is that our
common-sense conception of moral claims includes the authority platitudes. These arguments
apply equally in the epistemic domain. The error theorist, by arguing for the conceptual claim
in the moral domain, prohibits herself from adopting epistemic reductionism.59
Olson attempted to avoid the master argument by presenting epistemic reasons as a new
type of reducible reason which was meant to be immune from arguments like the authority
argument. He failed because these reasons are not different enough to enjoy such immunity.
Furthermore, he has not shown that moral reasons cannot be presented in the same light. As
57 Consider Joyce (2011, p.527–9), Olson (2014, p.130–135) and Mackie (1977/1990, p.31–5).
58 Foot’s (1972).
59 This can be found in Das (2017).
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such, he has given insufficient evidence to suggest that they ground disparity between moral
and epistemic reasons.
The moral error theorist’s arguments for the conceptual claim prohibit an appeal to the
Disparity Response. This is the master argument against Disparity Responses to the epistemic
companions in guilt strategy.
10 Conclusion
I have presented an argument against the Disparity Response to the epistemic companions in
guilt strategy. There are two options in response. One can find a startingly different profile for
epistemic reasons that make them immune from arguments like the authority argument. This is
what Olson (2018) attempted to do and I have argued that his attempt failed. Alternatively, one
can find more fine-grained arguments for the conceptual claim – ones that apply only to moral
reasons and not to epistemic reasons.
The epistemic companions in guilt argument only has two premises. I have argued that the
error theorist shouldn’t reject the Parity Premise. The only other option is to reject the
Epistemic Existence premise.
We have reached an impasse – either moral error theory is false or epistemic error theory is
true. The epistemic companions in guilt strategy puts serious pressure on the moral error
theorist. I have shown that the only way for the moral error theorist to respond is to endorse
epistemic error theory – this is the unappealing path the moral error theorist must take.
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